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AP AL is an extension of public announcement logic. It is based on a modal operator
that expresses what is true after any arbitrary announcement.An incorrect Truth Lemma
has been stated and ‘demonstrated’ in Balbiani et al. (2008). In this paper, we put right
the wording and the proof of the Truth Lemma for AP AL .
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1. Introduction
Public announcement logic (P AL) is an extension of epistemic logic with modal operators
that expresswhat is true after such and such announcement Plaza (2007).Themodal operator
[φ] means ‘if φ holds, then after the announcement of φ, . . .’, whereas the dual modal
operator 〈φ〉 means ‘φ holds and after the announcement of φ, . . .’. Within the context of
P AL , it becomes possible to reason about information flow. Formally, in P AL , a formula
such as 〈φ〉Kaψ stands for ‘φ holds and after the announcement of φ, agent a knows that
ψ holds’. Membership in P AL is known to be P S P AC E-complete (Lutz, 2006). Further
examples of announcement-based extensions of epistemic logic abound (for details, see
Van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, & Kooi, 2007).
Arbitrary public announcement logic (AP AL) is an extension of P AL with a modal
operator that expresses what is true after any arbitrary announcement (Balbiani et al., 2008).
The modal operator ✷ means ‘after every announcement, . . .’ whereas the dual modal
operator ✸ ‘after some announcement, . . .’. Within the context of AP AL , formulas such
as ✷φ and ✸φ are semantically equivalent, respectively, to the infinite conjunction of all
formulas of the form [ψ]φ in which ψ is a purely epistemic formula and to the infinite
disjunction of all formulas of the form 〈ψ〉φ in which ψ is a purely epistemic formula.
Membership in AP AL is known to be undecidable (French & van Ditmarsch, 2008).
P AL is completely axiomatised by the ordinary laws of epistemic logic plus the so-
called ‘reduction axioms’ which allow us to eliminate modal operators of announcement,
one by one, from any P AL formula. To completely axiomatise AP AL is more difficult.
Nevertheless, an axiomatic system has been considered (see Balbiani et al., 2008, Table 2).
A peculiar derivation rule of this axiomatic system is the derivation rule R(✷) concerning
the dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after any arbitrary announcement
(see Balbiani et al., 2008, Definition 4.6). Such rules have been called ‘non-structural rules’
and ‘context dependent rules’(Goranko, 1998; Marx & Venema,1997). Whether they can
be replaced by more orthodox rules is a research subject in itself.
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Presented in Balbiani et al. (2008, Sections 4.4–4.5), the proof of completeness for
AP AL is based on the traditional tools and techniques of the canonical model construction:
the Lindenbaum Lemma and the Truth Lemma. The main effect of the infinitary variant
Rω(✷) of the derivation rule R(✷) considered in Balbiani et al. (2008, Section 4.3) is that
it makes the canonical model (consisting of all maximal consistent sets of formulas closed
under Rω(✷)) standard for the modal operators of arbitrary announcement. Concerning the
Lindenbaum Lemma considered in Balbiani et al., it happens that its wording and its proof
are correct. In this introduction, let us see why the same cannot be said for the wording and
the proof of the Truth Lemma considered in Balbiani et al.
The Truth Lemma considered in Balbiani et al. (2008, p. 327) can be worded in the
following way: (A) for all non-negative integers m, for all formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm and for
all possible worlds x in the canonical model Mc of AP AL , if ψ1 ∈ x, . . . , [ψ1] . . .
[ψm−1]ψm ∈ x , then x ∈ ‖φ‖Mc |ψ1...|ψm iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x . In the property (A),
the expression ‘Mc |ψ1...|ψm ’ denotes the restriction of Mc determined by the formulas
ψ1, . . . , ψm . The problem is that the assumptions ψ1 ∈ x, . . . , [ψ1] . . . [ψk−1]ψk ∈ x are
not strong enough to justify the existence of this restriction. It follows that the property (A)
is a piece of nonsense when the restriction ofMc determined by the formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm
does not exist.
Regardless of this first mistake in the wording of the Truth Lemma, a second mistake
concerns the proof of the Truth Lemma. In the case φ = Kaφ′ of the proof of (A) that has
been done by induction on φ, the assumption x 6∈ ‖Kaφ′‖Mc |ψ1 ...|ψm considered in Balbiani
et al. (2008), p. 328) only implies the existence of a maximal consistent theory y such that
y ∈ ‖ψ1‖Mc , . . . , y ∈ ‖ψm‖
Mc |ψ1 ...|ψm−1 , x Ra y and y 6∈ ‖φ′‖Mc |ψ1 ...|ψm . The problem is
that the facts y ∈ ‖ψ1‖Mc , . . . , y ∈ ‖ψm‖Mc |ψ1 ...|ψm−1 are not strong enough to imply that
ψ1 ∈ y, . . . , [ψ1] . . . [ψm−1]ψm ∈ y. And the facts ψ1 ∈ y, . . . , [ψ1] . . . [ψm−1]ψm ∈ y
are the ones we need in order to infer 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ 6∈ y from y 6∈ ‖φ′‖Mc |ψ1 ...|ψm .
In this paper, we put right the Truth Lemma for APAL by proving a new property
worded in the following way: (B) for all formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm , if m + deg(ψ1) + . . . +
deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , then for all possible worlds x in the canonical model Mc of
AP AL , x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x . In Section 6, the proof of (B)
will be done by induction on (i,m, φ). This means that a well-founded strict partial order
between triples such as (i,m, φ) will be used to provide the induction hypothesis. We
believe that this new wording of the Truth Lemma for AP AL and its proof by induction
on (i,m, φ) can be successfully applied to other AP AL-like dynamic epistemic logics
as well (Agotnes, Balbiani, van Ditmarsch, & Seban, 2010; Balbiani, van Ditmarsch, &
Kudinov, 2013; Kuijer, 2014).
The breakdown of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the syntax and Section 3
introduces the semantics. In Section 4, an axiomatic system is given. To carry out the proof
of its completeness in Section 6, we need to learn about theories in Section 5.
2. Syntax
Let Atm be a countably infinite set of atoms (with typical members denoted p, q , etc.) and
Agt be a finite set of agents (with typical members denoted a, b, etc.). The set Lapal of all
formulas (with typical members denoted φ, ψ , etc.) is inductively defined as follows:
• φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ ψ) | Kaφ | [φ]ψ | ✷φ,
where p is an atom and a is an agent. We define the other Boolean constructs as usual.
The formulas Kˆaφ, 〈φ〉ψ and ✸φ are obtained as abbreviations: Kˆaφ for ¬Ka¬φ, 〈φ〉ψ
for ¬[φ]¬ψ and ✸φ for ¬✷¬φ. We adopt the standard rules for omission of parentheses.
A derivation rule is a pair consisting of a set of formulas and a formula. The set of all
subformulas of a formula φ, represented by Sub(φ), is the set of formulas inductively
defined as follows:
• Sub(p) = {p},
• Sub(¬φ) = {¬φ} ∪ Sub(φ),
• Sub(φ ∧ ψ) = {φ ∧ ψ} ∪ Sub(φ) ∪ Sub(ψ),
• Sub(Kaφ) = {Kaφ} ∪ Sub(φ),
• Sub([φ]ψ) = {[φ]ψ} ∪ Sub(φ) ∪ Sub(ψ),
• Sub(✷φ) = {✷φ} ∪ Sub(φ).
We will say that a formula φ is ✷-free iff Sub(φ) contains no formula of the form ✷ψ .
A formula φ is said to be [·]-free iff Sub(φ) contains no formula of the form [ψ]χ . We will
say that a formula φ is epistemic iff φ is both ✷-free and [·]-free. The set Lpal considered
in Balbiani et al. (2008) is nothing but the set of all ✷-free formulas. As for the set Lel
considered in Balbiani et al., it is nothing but the set of all epistemic formulas. The size
of a formula φ, represented by Size(φ), is the non-negative integer inductively defined as
follows:
• Size(p) = 2,
• Size(¬φ) = Size(φ)+ 1,
• Size(φ ∧ ψ) = Size(φ)+ Size(ψ)+ 3,
• Size(Kaφ) = Size(φ)+ 3,
• Size([φ]ψ) = Size(φ)+ Size(ψ)+ 2,
• Size(✷φ) = Size(φ)+ 1.
We define the binary relation <Size between formulas in the following way:
• φ <Size ψ iff Size(φ) < Size(ψ).
Proposition 1. <Size is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
Proof. By the well-foundedness of the standard linear order between non-negative
integers. 
The ✷-depth of a formula φ, represented by d✷(φ), is the non-negative integer induc-
tively defined as follows:
• d✷(p) = 0,
• d✷(¬φ) = d✷(φ),
• d✷(φ ∧ ψ) = max{d✷(φ), d✷(ψ)},
• d✷(Kaφ) = d✷(φ),
• d✷([φ]ψ) = max{d✷(φ), d✷(ψ)},
• d✷(✷φ) = d✷(φ)+ 1.
We define the binary relation <d✷ between formulas in the following way:
• φ <d✷ ψ iff d✷(φ) < d✷(ψ).
Proposition 2. <d✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
Proof. By the well-foundedness of the standard linear order between non-negative
integers.
The binary relation <Sized✷ between formulas is defined in the following way:
• φ <Sized✷ ψ iff either d✷(φ) < d✷(ψ), or d✷(φ) = d✷(ψ) and Size(φ) < Size(ψ).
Proposition 3. <Sized✷ is a well-founded strict partial order between formulas.
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 2. 
Proposition 4. Let φ be a formula. If φ is epistemic, then d✷(φ) = 0.
Proof. By <Size-induction on φ. 
Lemma 5. Let φ,ψ be formulas and a ∈ Agt.
• φ <Sized✷ ¬φ,
• φ <Sized✷ φ ∧ ψ and ψ <
Size
d✷ φ ∧ ψ ,
• φ <Sized✷ Kaφ,
• φ <Sized✷ [φ]ψ and ψ <
Size
d✷ [φ]ψ ,
• if ψ is epistemic, then [ψ]φ <Sized✷ ✷φ.
Proof. Leaving to the reader the task of proving the first items, we only pay attention to
the last one. Supposeψ is epistemic and not [ψ]φ <Sized✷ ✷φ. Hence, d✷([ψ]φ) ≥ d✷(✷φ).
Thus,max{d✷(ψ), d✷(φ)} ≥ d✷(φ)+1. Sinceψ is epistemic, byProposition4,d✷(ψ) = 0.
Since max{d✷(ψ), d✷(φ)} ≥ d✷(φ)+ 1, d✷(φ) ≥ d✷(φ)+ 1: a contradiction. 
Now, let us consider a new atom denoted ♯. The set N F of all necessity forms (with
typical members denoted ϕ(♯), ϕ′(♯), etc.) is inductively defined as follows:
• ϕ(♯) ::= ♯ | φ → ϕ(♯) | Kaϕ(♯) | [φ]ϕ(♯),
where φ is a formula and a is an agent. The size of a necessity form ϕ(♯), represented
by Size(ϕ(♯)), is a non-negative integer that can be inductively defined in the same way
as Size(φ) of a formula φ. A well-founded strict partial order <Size between necessity
forms can be defined in the same way as the well-founded strict partial order<Size between
formulas.
Lemma 6. Let ϕ(♯) ∈ N F, φ be a formula and a be an agent.
• ϕ(♯) <Size φ → ϕ(♯),
• ϕ(♯) <Size Kaϕ(♯),
• ϕ(♯) <Size [φ]ϕ(♯).
Proof. Left to the reader. 
It is well worth noting that in each necessity form ϕ(♯), ♯ has a unique occurrence. The
result of the replacement of ♯ in its place in ϕ(♯) with a formula φ is a formula which will
be denoted as rep(ϕ(♯), φ). It is inductively defined as follows:
• rep(♯, φ) = φ,
• rep(ψ → ϕ(♯), φ) = ψ → rep(ϕ(♯), φ),
• rep(Kaϕ(♯), φ) = Karep(ϕ(♯), φ),
• rep([ψ]ϕ(♯), φ) = [ψ]rep(ϕ(♯), φ).
3. Semantics
A model is an ordered triple M = (W, R, V ) where W is a non-empty set of possible
worlds (with typical members denoted x , y, etc.), R is a function assigning to each agent a
an equivalence relation R(a) on W and V is a function assigning to each atom p a subset
V (p) ofW . For all agents a and for all S ⊆ W , let [Ra]S = {x : for all y ∈ W , if x Ra y, then
y ∈ S} and 〈Ra〉S = {x : there exists y ∈ W such that x Ra y and y ∈ S}. For all S ⊆ W , if
S 6= ∅, then M(S) will denote the model obtained as the restriction ofM to the possible
worlds in S. Since this restriction is not a model when S = ∅, the expression M(S) is a
piece of nonsense when S = ∅. The truth-set of a formula φ in a modelM = (W, R, V ),
represented by ‖φ‖M, is inductively defined as follows:
• ‖p‖M = V (p),
• ‖¬φ‖M = W \ ‖φ‖M,
• ‖φ ∧ ψ‖M = ‖φ‖M ∩ ‖ψ‖M,
• ‖Kaφ‖M = [Ra]‖φ‖M,
• ‖[φ]ψ‖M = if ‖φ‖M = ∅, then W , else (W \ ‖φ‖M) ∪ ‖ψ‖M(‖φ‖M),
• ‖✷φ‖M =
⋂
{‖[ψ]φ‖M: ψ is epistemic}.
The above definition of the truth-set of a formula in a model is implicitly based on the
well-founded strict partial order <Sized✷ between formulas and Lemma 5.
Proposition 7. Let φ,ψ be formulas and a ∈ Agt.
• ‖Kˆaφ‖M = 〈Ra〉‖φ‖M,
• ‖〈φ〉ψ‖M = if ‖φ‖M = ∅, then ∅, else ‖φ‖M ∩ ‖ψ‖M(‖φ‖M),
• ‖✸φ‖M =
⋃
{‖〈χ〉φ‖M: χ is epistemic}.
Proof. Left to the reader. 
We shall say that a formula φ is valid iff for all modelsM = (W, R, V ), ‖φ‖M = W .
A set Ŵ of formulas is said to be valid iff for all formulas φ ∈ Ŵ, φ is valid. We shall say
that a derivation rule (Ŵ, φ) is admissible iff if Ŵ is valid, then φ is valid.
Lemma 8. Let φ,ψ, χ be formulas, p ∈ Atm and a ∈ Agt. The following formulas are
valid:
(A0) all instantiations of propositional tautologies,
(A1) Ka(φ → ψ)→ (Kaφ → Kaψ),
(A2) Kaφ → φ,
(A3) Kaφ → Ka Kaφ,
(A4) φ → Ka Kˆaφ,
(A5) [φ]p ↔ (φ → p),
(A6) [φ]¬ψ ↔ (φ → ¬[φ]ψ),
(A7) [φ](ψ ∧ χ)↔ [φ]ψ ∧ [φ]χ ,
(A8) [φ]Kaψ ↔ (φ → Ka[φ]ψ),
(A9) [φ][ψ]χ ↔ [φ ∧ [φ]ψ]χ ,
(A10) if ψ is epistemic, then ✷φ → [ψ]φ.
Proof. Leaving to the reader the task of proving the first items, we only pay attention
to the last one. Suppose ψ is epistemic and ✷φ → [ψ]φ is not valid. Hence, there exists
a model M = (W, R, V ) such that ‖✷φ → [ψ]φ‖M 6= W . Thus, there exists x ∈ W
such that x ∈ ‖✷φ‖M and x 6∈ ‖[ψ]φ‖M. Since ψ is epistemic, x ∈ ‖[ψ]φ‖M: a
contradiction. 
Lemma 9. Let φ,ψ be formulas, a ∈ Agt and ϕ(♯) ∈ N F. The following derivation rules
are admissible:
(R0) ({φ, φ → ψ}, ψ),
(R1) ({φ}, Kaφ),
(R2) ({φ}, [ψ]φ),
(R3) ({rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ): ψ is epistemic}, rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)).
Proof. Leaving to the reader the task of proving the first items, we only pay attention to
the last one. Suppose ({rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ):ψ is epistemic}, rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)) is not admissible.
Hence, {rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ): ψ is epistemic} is valid and rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ) is not valid. Thus,
there exists a modelM = (W, R, V ) such that ‖rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)‖M 6= W . Therefore, there
exists x ∈ W such that x 6∈ ‖rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)‖M. By Proposition 13 below, there exists
an epistemic formula θ such that x 6∈ ‖rep(ϕ(♯), [θ ]φ)‖M. Since {rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ): ψ
is epistemic} is valid, rep(ϕ(♯), [θ ]φ) is valid. Consequently, ‖rep(ϕ(♯), [θ ]φ)‖M = W .
Hence, x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ(♯), [θ ]φ)‖M: a contradiction. 
Lemma 10. Let φ,ψ be formulas. For all models M = (W, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W ,
x ∈ ‖〈φ〉ψ‖M iff x ∈ ‖φ‖M and x ∈ ‖ψ‖M(‖φ‖M).
Proof. By Proposition 7. 
Proposition 11. Let m be a non-negative integer. If m ≥ 1, then for all formulasψ1, . . . , ψm ,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ↔ 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm is valid.
Proof. Suppose m ≥ 1. Let ψ1, . . . , ψm be formulas. By Lemma 10, 〈ψm〉⊤ ↔ ψm is
valid. Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ↔ 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm is valid. 
Proposition 12. For all non-negative integers m,
P(m): for all formulasψ1, . . . , ψm , for all p ∈ Atm, for all formulasφ,ψ , for all a ∈ Agt,
for all models M = (W, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W ,
• x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and x ∈ V (p),








• x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and for all y ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M, if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M,
• x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ‖
M
, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ‖M,
• x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and for all epistemic
formulas χ , if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖M, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ‖M.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 13. For all ϕ(♯) ∈ N F,
Q(ϕ(♯)): for all formulas φ, for all models M = (W, R, V ) and for all x ∈ W , x ∈
‖rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)‖M iff for all epistemic formulasψ , x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ)‖M.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
4. Axiomatisation
An axiomatic system consists of a collection of formulas and a collection of derivation rules.
Let us consider the axiomatic system consisting of formulas (A0)–(A10) and derivation
rules (R0)–(R3) considered in Lemmas 8 and 9 and let AP ALω be the least subset ofLapal
containing (A0)–(A10) and closed under (R0)–(R3).
Lemma 14. For all formulas ψ ,
R(ψ): for all formulas φ, ¬φ → [φ]ψ is in AP ALω.
Proof. By <Sized✷ -induction on ψ . 
Lemma 15. Let φ,ψ, χ be formulas. The following formulas are in AP ALω:
(1) [φ]⊥ ↔ ¬φ.
(2) [φ](ψ ∨ χ)↔ ([φ]ψ ∨ [φ]χ).
(3) [φ](ψ → χ)↔ ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ).
Proof. (1) Since⊥ is an abbreviation for p∧¬p, the following formulas are deductively
equivalent in AP ALω: [φ]⊥, [φ]p∧ [φ]¬p, (φ → p)∧ (φ → ¬[φ]p), (φ → p)∧ (φ →
¬(φ → p)), (φ → p) ∧ (φ → ¬p), ¬φ.
(2) Since ψ ∨ χ is an abbreviation for ¬(¬ψ ∧ ¬χ), the following formulas are
deductively equivalent in AP ALω: [φ](ψ ∨ χ), φ → ¬[φ](¬ψ ∧¬χ), φ → ¬([φ]¬ψ ∧
[φ]¬χ), φ → ¬((φ → ¬[φ]ψ) ∧ (φ → ¬[φ]χ)), φ → [φ]ψ ∨ [φ]χ . By Lemma 14,
¬φ → [φ]ψ∨[φ]χ is in AP ALω. Since [φ](ψ∨χ) and φ → [φ]ψ∨[φ]χ are deductively
equivalent in AP ALω, [φ](ψ∨χ) and [φ]ψ∨[φ]χ are deductively equivalent in AP ALω.
(3) Since ψ → χ is an abbreviation for ¬(ψ ∧ ¬χ), the following formulas are
deductively equivalent in AP ALω: [φ](ψ → χ), φ → ¬[φ](ψ ∧ ¬χ), φ → ¬([φ]ψ ∧
[φ]¬χ), φ → ¬([φ]ψ ∧ (φ → ¬[φ]χ)), φ → ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ). By Lemma 14,
¬φ → ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ) is in AP ALω. Since [φ](ψ → χ) and φ → ([φ]ψ → [φ]χ)
are deductively equivalent in AP ALω, [φ](ψ → χ) and [φ]ψ → [φ]χ are deductively
equivalent in AP ALω. 
Proposition 16. Let m be a non-negative integer. If m ≥ 1, then for all formulasψ1, . . . , ψm ,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ↔ 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ AP ALω.
Proof. By Lemma 15. 
Proposition 17. For all formulas φ, if φ ∈ AP ALω, then φ is valid.
Proof. By Lemmas 8 and 9. 
Proposition 18. For all ϕ(♯) ∈ N F,
S(ϕ(♯)): for all formulas φ and for all epistemic formulas ψ , rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ(♯),
[ψ]φ) ∈ AP ALω.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Looking at our axiomatic system attentively, the reader will notice that it contains the
same formulas and derivation rules as the axiomatic system AP ALω considered inBalbiani,
Baltag, van Ditmarsch, Herzig, Hoshi, & de Lima (2008, p. 325).
5. Canonical model
A set x of formulas is called a theory iff it satisfies the following conditions:
• x contains AP ALω,
• x is closed under (R0) and (R3).
Obviously, the least theory is AP ALω whereas the greatest theory is Lapal . A theory x
is said to be consistent iff ⊥ 6∈ x . Let us remark that the only inconsistent theory is Lapal .
Moreover, the reader may easily verify that a theory x is consistent iff for all formulas φ,
φ 6∈ x or ¬φ 6∈ x . We shall say that a theory x is maximal iff for all formulas φ, φ ∈ x or
¬φ ∈ x .
Lemma 19. Let φ,ψ be formulas. For all maximal consistent theories x,
• ⊥ 6∈ x,
• ¬φ ∈ x iff φ 6∈ x,
• (φ ∨ ψ) ∈ x iff φ ∈ x or ψ ∈ x.
Proof. Left to the reader. 
Let x be a theory. For all formulas φ and for all a ∈ Agt , let x +φ = {ψ : φ → ψ ∈ x},
Ka x = {φ: Kaφ ∈ x} and [φ]x = {ψ : [φ]ψ ∈ x}.
Lemma 20. Let φ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x,
• x + φ is a theory containing x and φ,
• [φ]x is a theory,
• Ka x is a theory.
Proof. By Balbiani et al. (2008, Lemma 4.11). 
Lemma 21. Let φ be a formula. For all theories x, x + φ is consistent iff ¬φ 6∈ x.
Proof. By Balbiani et al. (2008, Lemma 4.11). 
Lemma 22 (Lindenbaum Lemma). Each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal
consistent theory.
Proof. By Balbiani et al. (2008, Lemma 4.12). 
Lemma 23. Let a ∈ Agt. For all maximal consistent theories x, y, z,
• Ka x ⊆ x,
• if Ka x ⊆ y and Ka y ⊆ z, then Ka x ⊆ z,
• if Ka x ⊆ y, then Ka y ⊆ x.
Proof. Left to the reader. 
Lemma 24. Let φ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x, if Kaφ 6∈ x, then there
exists a maximal consistent theory y such that Ka x ⊆ y and φ 6∈ y.
Proof. Suppose Kaφ 6∈ x . Hence,φ 6∈ Ka x . By Lemmas 21 and 22, there exists amaximal
consistent theory y such that Ka x +¬φ ⊆ y. Thus, Ka x ⊆ y and φ 6∈ y. 
Lemma 25. Let φ be a formula. For all maximal consistent theories x, if φ ∈ x, then [φ]x
is a maximal consistent theory.
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ x . If [φ]x is not consistent, then ⊥ ∈ [φ]x . Hence, [φ]⊥ ∈ x . Thus,
¬φ ∈ x . Since x is consistent,φ 6∈ x : a contradiction. If [φ]x is notmaximal, then there exists
a formula ψ such that ψ 6∈ [φ]x and ¬ψ 6∈ [φ]x . Therefore, [φ]ψ 6∈ x and [φ]¬ψ 6∈ x .
Since x is maximal, ¬[φ]ψ ∈ x and ¬[φ]¬ψ ∈ x . Consequently, ¬([φ]ψ ∨ [φ]¬ψ) ∈ x .
Hence, ¬[φ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ x . Since x is consistent, [φ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) 6∈ x . Since ψ ∨ ¬ψ ∈
AP ALω, [φ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ AP ALω. Thus, [φ](ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ x : a contradiction. 
Lemma 26. Let φ,ψ be formulas. For all maximal consistent theories x, 〈φ〉ψ ∈ x iff
φ ∈ x and ψ ∈ [φ]x.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose 〈φ〉ψ ∈ x . Hence, 〈φ〉⊤ ∈ x . By Proposition 16, φ ∈ x . By
Lemma 25, [φ]x is a maximal consistent theory. Supposeψ 6∈ [φ]x . Since [φ]x is maximal,
¬ψ ∈ [φ]x . Thus, [φ]¬ψ ∈ x . Therefore, ¬〈φ〉ψ ∈ x . Since x is consistent, 〈φ〉ψ 6∈ x : a
contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose φ ∈ x and ψ ∈ [φ]x . By Lemma 25, [φ]x is a maximal consistent theory.
Suppose 〈φ〉ψ 6∈ x . Since x is maximal,¬〈φ〉ψ ∈ x . Hence, [φ]¬ψ ∈ x . Thus,¬ψ ∈ [φ]x .
Since [φ]x is consistent, ψ 6∈ [φ]x : a contradiction. 
Lemma 27. Let φ be a formula and a ∈ Agt. For all theories x, if φ ∈ x, then Ka[φ]x =
[φ]Ka x.
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ x . For all formulasψ , the reader may easily verify that the following
conditions are equivalent:
(1) ψ ∈ Ka[φ]x ,
(2) Kaψ ∈ [φ]x ,
(3) [φ]Kaψ ∈ x ,
(4) φ → Ka[φ]ψ ∈ x ,
(5) Ka[φ]ψ ∈ x ,
(6) [φ]ψ ∈ Ka x ,
(7) ψ ∈ [φ]Ka x .

Lemma 28. Let m be a non-negative integer. If m ≥ 1, then for all formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm ,
for all formulas φ and for all maximal consistent theories x, the following conditions are
equivalent:
• ψ1 ∈ x, 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and for all maximal consistent theories y containing
〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all maximal consistent theories y containing
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y.
Proof. Suppose m ≥ 1. (⇒) Suppose ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and for all maxi-
mal consistent theories y containing 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈
y. By Lemma 26, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . Let z be a maximal consistent theory containing
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤. Suppose Ka x ⊆ z. Hence, [ψ1]Ka x ⊆ [ψ1]z. Sinceψ1 ∈ x , byLemma27,
Ka[ψ1]x = [ψ1]Ka x . Since [ψ1]Ka x ⊆ [ψ1]z, Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ [ψ1]z. Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈
z, by Lemma 26, ψ1 ∈ z and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]z. Since for all maximal consistent
theories y containing 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y and
Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ [ψ1]z, 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ [ψ1]z. Since ψ1 ∈ z, by Lemma 26, 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ ∈ z.
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all maximal consistent theories y containing
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y. By Lemma 26, ψ1 ∈ x and
〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x . Let z be a maximal consistent theory containing 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤.
Suppose Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ z. Since ψ1 ∈ x , by Lemma 27, Ka[ψ1]x = [ψ1]Ka x . Since
Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ z, [ψ1]Ka x ⊆ z. We consider the following 2 cases.
Case Ka[ψ1] . . . [ψm]φ ∈ x . Hence, [ψ1] . . . [ψm]φ ∈ Ka x . Thus, [ψ2] . . . [ψm]φ ∈
[ψ1]Ka x . Since [ψ1]Ka x ⊆ z, [ψ2] . . . [ψm]φ ∈ z. Since 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ z, 〈ψ2〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ ∈ z.
Case Ka[ψ1] . . . [ψm]φ 6∈ x . Hence, there exists a maximal consistent theory t such
that Ka x ⊆ t and [ψ1] . . . [ψm]φ 6∈ t . Thus, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ t and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ 6∈ t .
Since for all maximal consistent theories y containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ t : a contradiction. 
Proposition 29. For all non-negative integers m,
T (m): for all formulasψ1, . . . , ψm , for all p ∈ Atm, for all formulas φ,ψ , for all a ∈ Agt
and for all maximal consistent theories x,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and p ∈ x,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ 6∈ x,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all maximal consistent
theories y containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x,
then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ ∈ x,
• 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ and for all epistemic formulas ψ , if
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ ∈ x.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 30. Let ϕ(♯) ∈ N F and φ be a formula. For all theories x, if rep(ϕ(♯),✷φ) ∈ x,
then for all epistemic formulas ψ , rep(ϕ(♯), [ψ]φ) ∈ x.
Proof. By Proposition 18. 
Now, the canonical structureMc = (Wc, Rc, Vc) is defined as follows:
• Wc is the set of all maximal consistent theories,
• Rc is the function assigning to each agent a the binary relation Rc(a) on Wc defined
as follows:
– x Rc(a)y iff Ka x ⊆ y,
• Vc is the function assigning to each atom p the subset Vc(p) ofWc defined as follows:
– x ∈ Vc(p) iff p ∈ x .
This is obviously a model: by Lemma 22, Wc is a non-empty set and by Lemma 23, the
binary relation Rc(a) is an equivalence relation on Wc for each agent a.
6. Completeness
Let X = N× N× Lapal . We define the binary relation≪ on X in the following way:
• (i,m, φ) ≪ ( j, n, ψ) iff either i < j , or i = j and m < n, or i = j , m = n and
φ <Size ψ .
Lemma 31. ≪ is a well-founded strict partial order on X.
Proof. By thewell-foundedness of the standard linear order between non-negative integers
and Proposition 1. 
Thedegree of a formulaφ, represented by deg(φ), is the non-negative integer inductively
defined as follows:
• deg(p) = 0,
• deg(¬φ) = deg(φ),
• deg(φ ∧ ψ) = max{deg(φ), deg(ψ)},
• deg(Kaφ) = deg(φ),
• deg([φ]ψ) = deg(φ)+ deg(ψ)+ 2,
• deg(✷φ) = deg(φ)+ 2.
Lemma 32 (Truth Lemma). For all (i,m, φ) ∈ X,
U (i,m, φ): For all formulas ψ1, . . . , ψm , if m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤
i , then for all maximal consistent theories x, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖Mc iff
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x.
Proof See the Appendix. 
The following result is a direct consequence of Lemma 32.
Proposition 33. Let φ be a formula. For all maximal consistent theories x, x ∈ ‖φ‖Mc iff
φ ∈ x.
Proof. By Lemma 32. 
Now, we are ready to prove the completeness of AP ALω.
Proposition 34. For all formulas φ, if φ is valid, then φ ∈ AP ALω.
Proof. Supposeφ is valid andφ 6∈ AP ALω. ByLemmas 21 and 22, there exists amaximal
consistent theory x containing ¬φ. By Proposition 33, x 6∈ ‖φ‖Mc . Hence, ‖φ‖Mc 6= Wc.
Thus, φ is not valid: a contradiction. 
7. Remarks
In this paper, the set of agents is finite. In the absence of modal operators that express mutual
knowledge (everybody knows) or common knowledge (everybody knows that everybody
knows that . . .), the change to a countably infinite set of agents would affect neither the
axiomatisation, nor the proof of completeness.
In other respects, the second component in a model M = (W, R, V ) is a function
R assigning to each agent a an equivalence relation R(a). The change to relations R(a)
satisfying no specific conditions would affect neither the axiomatisation nor the proof of
completeness – apart from the formulas (A2)–(A4) and Lemma 23.
Several AP AL-like dynamic epistemic logics have been proposed (for details, see
Agotnes et al., 2010; Balbiani et al., 2013; Kuijer, 2014). We believe that their axiomati-
sation/completeness can be successfully based on variants of the axiomatic system and the
proof of completeness developed for AP AL in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 12. Let m be a non-negative integer. Suppose (H) for all non-negative integers
n, if n < m, then P(n). If m = 0, then the reader may easily verify that P(m). Otherwise, let
ψ1, . . . , ψm be formulas, p ∈ Atm, φ,ψ be formulas, a ∈ Agt , M = (W, R, V ) be a model and
x ∈ W . Since (H), P(m − 1).
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and x ∈ V (p),
(4) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and x ∈ V (p).
Hence, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and x ∈ V (p).
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ, the readermay easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(4) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M.
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ), the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ)‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ)‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(4) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ‖M.




About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and for all y ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
M(‖ψ1‖M), if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,




Hence, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and for all y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
M
, if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M.
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ , the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and if x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
then x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,




Hence, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ‖
M
, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ‖M.
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ, the readermay easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M and x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(3) x ∈ ‖ψ1‖M, x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M(‖ψ1‖
M) and for all epistemic formulas χ , if x ∈
‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ‖M(‖ψ1‖
M)
,
(4) x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and for all epistemic formulas χ , if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖M,
then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ‖M iff x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and for all epistemic formulas
χ , if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖M, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ‖M.
Remark. In all cases, the equivalence between (1) and (2) follows from the definition of truth-sets,
the equivalence between (2) and (3) follows from P(m − 1) and the equivalence between (3) and (4)
follows from the definition of truth-sets.

Proof of Proposition 13. Let ϕ(♯) ∈ N F . Supose (H) for all ϕ′(♯) ∈ N F , if ϕ′(♯) <Size ϕ(♯), then
Q(ϕ′(♯)). Let φ be a formula,M = (W, R, V ) be a model and x ∈ W . We consider the following 4
cases.
Case ϕ(♯) = ♯. The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖rep(♯,✷φ)‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖✷φ‖M,
(3) for all epistemic formulas ψ , x ∈ ‖[ψ]φ‖M,
(4) for all epistemic formulas ψ , x ∈ ‖rep(♯, [ψ]φ)‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖rep(♯,✷φ)‖M iff for all epistemic formulas ψ , x ∈ ‖rep(♯, [ψ]φ)‖M.
Case ϕ(♯) = ψ → ϕ′(♯). The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖rep(ψ → ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖ψ → rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(3) if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(4) if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(5) for all epistemic formulas χ , if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(6) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖ψ → rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(7) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep(ψ → ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖rep(ψ → ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M iff for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep(ψ →
ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M.
Case ϕ(♯) = Kaϕ′(♯). The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖rep(Kaϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(2) x ∈ ‖Karep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(3) for all y ∈ W , if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(4) for all y ∈ W , if x Ra y, then for all epistemic formulas χ , y ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(5) for all epistemic formulas χ and for all y ∈ W , if x Ra y, then x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(6) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖Karep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(7) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep(Kaϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖rep(Kaϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M iff for all epistemic formulasχ , x ∈ ‖rep(Kaϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M.
Case ϕ(♯) = [ψ]ϕ′(♯). The reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) x ∈ ‖rep([ψ]ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(1) x ∈ ‖[ψ]rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M,
(2) if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M(‖ψ‖M),
(3) if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M(‖ψ‖M),
(4) for all epistemic formulas χ , if x ∈ ‖ψ‖M, then x ∈ ‖rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M(‖ψ‖M),
(5) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖[ψ]rep(ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M,
(6) for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep([ψ]ϕ′(♯), [χ ]φ)‖M.
Hence, x ∈ ‖rep([ψ]ϕ′(♯),✷φ)‖M iff for all epistemic formulas χ , x ∈ ‖rep([ψ]ϕ′(♯),
[χ ]φ)‖M. 
Remark. In the first case, the equivalence between (1)and (2) follows from the definition of rep(·, ·),
the equivalence between (2) and (3) follows from the definition of truth-sets and the equivalence
between (3) and (4) follows from the definition of rep(·, ·). Note that in all other cases, the equivalence
between (1) and (2) follows from the definition of rep(·, ·), the equivalence between (2) and (3) follows
from the definition of truth-sets, the equivalence between (3) and (4) follows from (H), the equivalence
between (4) and (5) follows from logical reasoning, the equivalence between (5) and (6) follows from
the definition of truth-sets and the equivalence between (6) and (7) follows from the definition of
rep(·, ·). 
Proof of Proposition 18. Let ϕ(♯) ∈ N F . Suppose (H) for all ϕ′(♯) ∈ N F , if ϕ′(♯) <Size ϕ(♯), then
S(ϕ′(♯)). Let φ be a formula and ψ be an epistemic formula. We consider the following 4 cases.
Case ϕ(♯) = ♯. Since ψ is epistemic, ✷φ → [ψ]φ ∈ AP ALω. Hence, rep(♯,✷φ) →
rep(♯, [ψ]φ) ∈ AP ALω.
Case ϕ(♯) = χ → ϕ′(♯). If rep(χ → ϕ′(♯),✷φ) → rep(χ → ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) 6∈ AP ALω, then
χ → (rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ) → rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ)) 6∈ AP ALω. Hence, rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ) → rep(ϕ′(♯),
[ψ]φ) 6∈ AP ALω. Now, note that ϕ′(♯) <Size ϕ(♯). By (H), rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) ∈
AP ALω: a contradiction.
Case ϕ(♯) = Kaϕ′(♯). If rep(Kaϕ′(♯),✷φ) → rep(Kaϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) 6∈ AP ALω, then
Ka(rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ)) 6∈ AP ALω.Hence, rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) 6∈
AP ALω.Now, note thatϕ′(♯) <Size ϕ(♯). By (H), rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) ∈ AP ALω:
a contradiction.
Case ϕ(♯) = [χ ]ϕ′(♯). If rep([χ ]ϕ′(♯),✷φ) → rep([χ ]ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) 6∈ AP ALω, then
[χ ](rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ)) 6∈ AP ALω.Hence, rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) 6∈
AP ALω.Now, note thatϕ′(♯) <Size ϕ(♯). By (H), rep(ϕ′(♯),✷φ)→ rep(ϕ′(♯), [ψ]φ) ∈ AP ALω:
a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 29. Letm be a non-negative integer. Suppose (H) for all non-negative integers n,
if n < m, then T (n). Ifm = 0, then the readermay easily verify that T (m). Otherwise, letψ1, . . . , ψm
be formulas, p ∈ Atm, φ,ψ be formulas, a ∈ Agt and x be a maximal consistent theory. Since (H),
T (m − 1).
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ x ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and p ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and p ∈ x .
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and p ∈ x .
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ, the readermay easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ ∈ x ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ 6∈ [ψ1]x ,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ 6∈ x .
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ 6∈ x .
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ), the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are
equivalent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ x ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ [ψ1]x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x .
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ ∧ ψ) ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x .
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ, the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equiva-
lent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ ∈ x ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and for all maximal consistent theories y containing
〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka[ψ1]x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all maximal consistent theories y containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤,
if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y.
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all maximal consistent theories y
containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ y.
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ , the reader may easily verify that the following conditions are equiv-
alent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ ∈ x ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and if 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ [ψ1]x , then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ ∈
[ψ1]x ,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ ∈ x .
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ]ψ ∈ x iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x , then
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉ψ ∈ x .
About 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ, the readermay easily verify that the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ,
(2) ψ1 ∈ x and 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(3) ψ1 ∈ x , 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ [ψ1]x and for all epistemic formulas ψ , if 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈
[ψ1]x , then 〈ψ2〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ ∈ [ψ1]x ,
(4) 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ and for all epistemic formulas ψ , if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ ∈ x .
Hence, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ and for all epistemic formulasψ , if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈
x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ ∈ x .
Remark. In the case 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ, the equivalence between (1) and (2) follows from
Lemma (26), the equivalence between (2) and (3) follows from (H) and the equivalence between
(3) and (4) follows from Lemmas (26) and (28). Note that in all the other cases, the equivalence
between (1) and (2) follows from Lemma (26), the equivalence between (2) and (3) follows from (H)
and the equivalence between (3) and (4) follows from Lemma (26).

Proof of Lemma 32. Let (i,m, φ) ∈ X . Suppose (H) for all ( j, n, ψ) ∈ X , if ( j, n, ψ) ≪ (i,m, φ),
then U ( j, n, ψ). Let ψ1, . . . , ψm be formulas such that m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) +
deg(φ) ≤ i . 
Claim 35. For all maximal consistent theories x, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x.
Proof. Let x be a maximal consistent theory. The case m = 0 is obvious. Hence, we only pay
attention to the case m ≥ 1.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . By Proposition 11, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm‖Mc .
Now, note that (i,m − 1, ψm) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i,m − 1, ψm). Since m + deg(ψ1) + . . . +
deg(ψm)+deg(φ) ≤ i ,m−1+deg(ψ1)+ . . .+deg(ψm−1)+deg(ψm) ≤ i . SinceU (i,m−1, ψm),
x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ x . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm‖Mc ,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ x . By Proposition 16, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x .
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . By Proposition 16, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ x . Again, note
that (i,m − 1, ψm) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i,m − 1, ψm). Since m + deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+
deg(φ) ≤ i , m − 1 + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm−1) + deg(ψm) ≤ i . Since U (i,m − 1, ψm),
x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm ∈ x , x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm−1〉ψm‖Mc . By Proposition 11, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . 
Claim 36. For all maximal consistent theories x, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ ∈ x.
Proof. Let x be a maximal consistent theory. We consider the following 7 cases.
Case φ = p.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
Mc and x ∈ Vc(p). By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . Moreover, p ∈ x . By Proposition 29,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ x .
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉p ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and p ∈ x . By
Claim 35, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Moreover, x ∈ Vc(p). By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉p‖Mc .
Case φ = ¬φ′.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ′‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
Mc and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc . By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . Now, note that
(i,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i,m, φ′). Since m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i ,
m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i . Since U (i,m, φ′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x . Since x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc , 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ 6∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈
x , by Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ′ ∈ x .
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ′ ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ
′ 6∈ x . By Claim 35, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Again, note that (i,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ).
By (H), U (i,m, φ′). Since m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1) + . . . +
deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i . Since U (i,m, φ′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x .
Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ 6∈ x , x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , by
Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉¬φ′‖Mc .
Case φ = φ′ ∧ φ′′.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ′ ∧ φ′′)‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc
and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′‖Mc . Now, note that (i,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ) and (i,m, φ′′) ≪ (i,m, φ).
By (H), U (i,m, φ′) and U (i,m, φ′′). Since m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , m +
deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i and m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′′) ≤
i . Since U (i,m, φ′) and U (i,m, φ′′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and
x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′ ∈ x . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc and x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′‖Mc , 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′ ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉(φ
′ ∧ φ′′) ∈ x .
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ′ ∧ φ′′) ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ
′′ ∈ x . Again, note that (i,m, φ′)≪ (i,m, φ) and (i,m, φ′′)≪ (i,m, φ). By (H),U (i,m, φ′)
andU (i,m, φ′′). Sincem+deg(ψ1)+ . . .+deg(ψm)+deg(φ) ≤ i ,m+deg(ψ1)+ . . .+deg(ψm)+
deg(φ′) ≤ i andm+deg(ψ1)+. . .+deg(ψm)+deg(φ′′) ≤ i . SinceU (i,m, φ′) andU (i,m, φ′′), x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′ ∈
x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′ ∈ x , x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc and x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′′‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉(φ′ ∧ φ′′)‖Mc .
Case φ = Kaφ′.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ′‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
Mc and for all y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc .
By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ′ 6∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈
x , by Proposition 29, there exists a maximal consistent theory z containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ such
that Ka x ⊆ z and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ 6∈ z. By Claim 35, z ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Moreover,
x Raz. Since for all y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , if x Ra y, then y ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc , z ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc . Now, note that (i,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i,m, φ′). Since m +
deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i . Since
U (i,m, φ′), z ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ z. Since z ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc ,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ z: a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ′ ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all
maximal consistent theories y containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈
y. By Claim 35, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Suppose x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉Kaφ′‖Mc . Since x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , by Proposition 12, there exists z ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc such that x Raz
and z 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc . By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ z. Moreover, Ka x ⊆ z. Since for
all maximal consistent theories y containing 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤, if Ka x ⊆ y, then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈
y, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ z. Now, note that (i,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i,m, φ′). Since m +
deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i . Since
U (i,m, φ′), z ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ z. Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ z, z ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc : a contradiction.
Case φ = [φ′]φ′′.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖M and
if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖M, then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ〉φ′′‖M. By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x .
Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′ 6∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x , by Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈
x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ 6∈ x . Now, note that (i − 1,m, φ′) ≪ (i,m, φ) and (i − 1,m +
1, φ′′) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i − 1,m, φ′) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′′). Since m + deg(ψ1) +
. . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1) + . . . + deg(ψm) + deg(φ′) ≤ i − 1 and m + 1 +
deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+ deg(φ′)+ deg(φ′′) ≤ i − 1. Since U (i − 1,m, φ′) and U (i − 1,m +
1, φ′′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′‖Mc
iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ ∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ 6∈ x , x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′‖Mc . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , by
Proposition 12, x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′‖Mc : a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′ ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and if 〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉φ
′ ∈ x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ ∈ x . By Claim 35, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Sup-
pose x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′‖Mc . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc , by Proposition 12, x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′‖Mc . Now, note that (i−1,m, φ′)≪ (i,m, φ)
and (i − 1,m + 1, φ′′) ≪ (i,m, φ). By (H), U (i − 1,m, φ′) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′′). Since
m + deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+ deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+ deg(φ′) ≤ i − 1 and
m+1+deg(ψ1)+. . .+deg(ψm)+deg(φ′)+deg(φ′′) ≤ i−1. SinceU (i−1,m, φ′) andU (i−1,m+
1, φ′′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′‖Mc iff
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ ∈ x . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′‖Mc and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′‖Mc ,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉φ′ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈φ′〉φ′′ 6∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x , by Proposition 29,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉[φ′]φ′′ 6∈ x : a contradiction.
Case φ = ✷φ′.
(⇒) Suppose x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ′‖Mc . By Proposition 12, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉⊤‖
Mc and for all epistemic formulas ψ , if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ‖Mc , then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . .
〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ
′‖Mc . By Claim 35, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x . Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ′ 6∈ x . Since
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x , byProposition29, there exists an epistemic formulaχ such that 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ ∈
x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ 6∈ x . Now, note that (i − 1,m, χ) ≪ (i,m, φ) and (i − 1,m + 1, φ′) ≪
(i,m, φ). By (H), U (i − 1,m, χ) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′). Moreover, note that since χ is epistemic,
by Proposition 4, deg(χ) = 0. Since m + deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+ deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1)+
. . .+deg(ψm)+deg(χ) ≤ i −1 andm+1+deg(ψ1)+ . . .+deg(ψm)+deg(χ)+deg(φ′) ≤ i −1.
Since U (i − 1,m, χ) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ ∈ x
and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ ∈ x . Since 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ ∈ x and
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ 6∈ x , x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖Mc and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc . Since for
all epistemic formulas ψ , if x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ‖Mc , then x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ′‖Mc and χ is
epistemic, x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc : a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ′ ∈ x . By Proposition 29, 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤ ∈ x and for all
epistemic formulas ψ , if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ′ ∈ x . By Claim 35, x ∈
‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc . Suppose x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉✷φ′‖Mc . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉⊤‖Mc ,
by Proposition 12, there exists an epistemic formula χ such that x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖Mc and
x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc . Now, note that (i − 1,m, χ) ≪ (i,m, φ) and (i − 1,m + 1, φ′) ≪
(i,m, φ). By (H), U (i − 1,m, χ) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′). Moreover, note that since χ is epistemic,
by Proposition 4, deg(χ) = 0. Since m + deg(ψ1)+ . . .+ deg(ψm)+ deg(φ) ≤ i , m + deg(ψ1)+
. . .+deg(ψm)+deg(χ) ≤ i −1 andm+1+deg(ψ1)+ . . .+deg(ψm)+deg(χ)+deg(φ′) ≤ i −1.
Since U (i − 1,m, χ) and U (i − 1,m + 1, φ′), x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ ∈ x
and x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc iff 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ ∈ x . Since x ∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ‖Mc
and x 6∈ ‖〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′‖Mc , 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉χ ∈ x and 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ 6∈ x . Since for all
epistemic formulas ψ , if 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉ψ ∈ x , then 〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈ψ〉φ′ ∈ x and χ is epistemic,
〈ψ1〉 . . . 〈ψm〉〈χ〉φ′ ∈ x : a contradiction.
From Claim 36, we infer U (i,m, φ). 
